The roots of these cheap food policies are many and deep. Until they are eliminated, little real progress is possible. There is still the monolithic pursuit of industrialization. Country after country has already paid a very high price for this unbalanced kind of economic growth. In contrast, the economic policies of Israel, Taiwan, and Mexico are models of successful agricultural and industrial growth.
Industrialization has often been accomplished at the expense of agriculture. During the postwar period, this approach was considered good policy in many countries. Now, however, there are second thoughts with respect to the consequences of this type of exploitation of farm people.
Another root of a cheap food policy has been holding down the price of food to check inflation. Many a country has held down particular food prices in the consumer price index as, for example, Chile is now holding down the domestic price of beef, with serious adverse results. Thus, a government tries to check inflation by holding down the price of beef, poultry, and wheat, and very soon it distorts both the level of farm prices and the relation of one farm price to another. Consumer prices are then also distorted. Chileans are stuffing themselves with beef, which is all too cheap, so the government undertakes food rationing to keep consumers from eating too much beef; but restricting the sale of beef to two days a week places those families who have a refrigerator in a privileged position.
Price-fixing to hold down the consumer price index gives the wrong economic instructions to consumers, and is very wrong in what it does to incentive in agriculture.
Consider India, with her attempt at regional food rationing which has been a serious mistake, for it keeps farm prices low in the surplus areas. Thus, there will be a legacy of the bad monsoon carried into the future which will be more serious than we allow ourselves to think.
Another root has been the concern about foreign exchange. Here, too, the approach has been arbitrary. It has overvalued the inside currency and this in turn has produced serious distortions in farm product prices. Such price distortions are still exceedingly serious in India, Chile, and other countries, though Pakistan during recent years has been an exception. I do not know what has happened since the war between India and Pakistan, but three or four years prior to that the price distortions were much reduced and agricultural production began to increase at a favorable pace.
There has also been still another root, using an export tax on farm products as an easy source of public revenue, especially so in a number of West African countries which established marketing boards during the war. These marketing boards took a certain amount of the price as revenue, by selling the products at the world price but paying farmers much less. For example, two years ago when I was in Nigeria, farmers were receiving for their palm fruits about half of the world price and, of course, production was declining. Moreover, palm oil was being "wasted" for it had become so cheap in Nigeria that it was being used for kerosene as a substitute for fuel; yet if there is a "gold mine" in Nigeria, in pure economic values, it is palm fruit! One reason for the comparative advantage of palm fruit is the genetic breakthrough on the part of biological research some years ago, but the potential economic gain from this advance in useful knowledge is being wasted by a bad price policy.
Let us turn next to the inputs that farmers must buy if they are to modernizefertilizer, insecticides, other chemicals, tools, equipment, machines, fuel, and repairs. In general, where these are available, they are very expensive. The prices of such agricultural inputs are not only high but are also distorted relative to each other in most poor countries. Competition is weak, for it is much impaired by all manner of barriers to trade in order to protect the domestic producers of these inputs from foreign competition. Morever, internal competition is weakened by domains of monopoly. In some countries the production of some key agricultural inputs is restricted to the public sector. Where production is in the private sector, the suppliers of these inputs are not subject to open and free competition, as a rule. It is no wonder that these essential inputs are, in general, so very expensive to farmers.
Fertilizer deserves a special comment because it has become one of the principal inputs in increasing agricultural production. Although the discovery that nitrogen, phosphate, and potash can increase yields is not new, the profitability of using vast quantities of commercial fertilizer in farming throughout the world is largely a post-World War II development. The dominant factor underlying this development has been a decline in the supply price of commercially produced fertilizer materials-relative to farm product prices. Farmers must now learn how to use it efficiently, which is not very difficult provided that the variety of wheat or rice they grow is responsive to the application of fertilizer and provided that rainfall and supplementary sources of water are sufficient.
Although relatively cheap fertilizer opens the door to the promised land with its new and better opportunities for farmers, this door remains closed in most poor countries. As a consequence, it has not been profitable for farmers in these countries to buy and use large additional quantities of fertilizer, because the advantage of the decline in world prices of materials that provide nitrogen, phosphate, and potash has not been extended to them. Despite all good intentions and efforts, this door is still shut in India. On the other hand, Pakistan has opened it for nitrogen, and so has Taiwan for all types of commercial fertilizer, but these are among the exceptions.
Although Chile is an exporter of nitrogenous materials which she sells at world prices, these materials are anything but cheap to farmers there. Strange as it may seem, the fact is that the price is prohibitively high in Chile, and the obvious reason for this price distortion is that the price is rigged. Chile is playing a monopoly game in producing and selling nitrogenous materials. The government is a partner of private producers in this game of exploiting Chilean farmers. The logic of this game is as follows: The material that is exported must be sold at the world price which is low and thus it is presumed that it is sold at a loss; to offset this presumed loss, the price in Chile is rigged and it is sold in Chile at a price that is far above the world price. What a sad perversion of economic logic! In some countries there are already many types of complex machines and tractors. With respect to these, it is the lack of organization and the pricing of repair parts that is appallingly inefficient; in the Soviet Union, for example, tractors are standing idle after a couple of years of use for lack of parts that have broken or have worn out. The cost and the time it takes to obtain repair parts is the explanation.
Why are agricultural input prices so far out of line in these countries? As I have already noted, the domestic firms that produce agricultural inputs are, as a rule, sheltered by a policy of import substitution in order to encourage local industries. Since these local industries are high-cost producers, the result is that the prices of essential agricultural inputs are both very high and badly distorted. A brief reference to the third set of prices will suffice, namely, the prices of the consumer goods and services that farm people buy. There has been all too little recognition of the economic importance of this set of prices, which really matter because they are the key to the purchasing power of the net income earned by farm people. In general, farm people in poor countries have come off badlyinwhat they can buy with their earnings. While it is to be expected that the prices of consumer goods and services that are produced in urban areas will be somewhat higher when they reach the countryside, the difficulty is that these prices have been rising relative to the prices at which farmers sell their products and, in many instances, the quality of the items they buy has been declining.
In sum, what I have said with regard to the lack of an efficient system of prices for agriculture in these countries is of three parts: farm product prices are in general too low and badly distorted; on the other hand, agricultural input prices are too high and also distorted; and the prices of consumer items that farm people buy have been rising relative to what farmers sell, and the quality of these items has in many cases been declining.
High-payoff agricultural inputs required: Although an efficient system of prices is a necessary economic requirement, it is not sufficient to assure increases in food supplies. Such a system of prices sets the stage for farmers to make the best possible use of the resources available to them. Once they have exhausted the profitable opportunities immediately at hand, however, further increases in production are hard to come by unless there are new and profitable inputs.
The widely held belief that there are many unexhausted opportunities readily available to farmers in poor countries is patently false. Failing to see the lack of rewarding opportunities, it has been all too convenient to blame farmers. A typical refrain runs thus: Farmers farm badly, they are not industrious, they loaf too much, they squander their savings, and they prefer not to improve their economic lot. So a doctrine is born which has misled us badly, despite some exceptions to which I shall refer later. In general, we have failed as builders of agriculture in poor countries. We have been blind to the plain fact that farmers in poor countries are shrewd, hardheaded, calculating people in their economic affairs. Whenever there is a real payoff, they respond.
Therefore, we should see to it that our programs create opportunities that induce farmers to increase production because it pays them to dQ so. In the operation of programs established under Public Law 480, however, we have been responsible for doing precisely the opposite; that is, we have reduced the economic opportunities of farmers in most countries that receive P.L. 480 farm products from us. We have conveniently concealed from ourselves the adverse effects on farm product prices in the countries receiving large P.L. 480 imports. Instead of assisting them in developing a more productive agricultural sector, we have had a hand in reducing the payoff to farmers in these countries below what it otherwise would have been. I do not wish to imply that P.L. 480 imports have not provided additional resources of substantial economic value to most of the receiving countries; they have done so, but they have also had an adverse effect on the development of agriculture. The availability of P.L. 480 farm products has not only made it possible for these governments to be complacent about agriculture, but it has also impaired the economic incentives for agricultural production in these countries.
Putting the blame on farmers and not seeing the lack of payoff opportunities, we have made the mistake (1) of assuming that there were available in these countries usable and profitable new agricultural techniques, varieties of crops, vegetables and fruits, and other agricultural inputs; (2) of starting with extension programs before there was anything worth while to extend to farmers; (3) of linking many a land-grant agricultural college through US-AID to a Ministry of Agriculture abroad to concentrate on improving administration and information instead of a collegeto-college arrangement with at least some emphasis on research; (4) of undertaking a country-wide community development program without regard to economic possibilities; and (5) of joining a government in an extensive package program without sufficient attention to the profitability of such a program for farmers.
Payoff opportunities from the advance in knowledge: Although a system of efficient prices will usually reveal some rewarding opportunities, once these have been exhausted the further progress of agriculture is dependent upon a wide array of modern agricultural inputs, modern in the sense that they are the fruit of organized agricultural research.
We live in a period in which there is indeed an agricultural revolution. Scientific and technical knowledge in the West is so far ahead, in terms of what is theoretically possible, that what we see in more than half of the world is obsolete by a very wide margin. It is this stock of knowledge that warrants a large measure of optimism. This knowledge is exceedingly valuable, although much of it is still theoretical, in the sense that the appropriate varieties of rice, wheat, and so on, for many countries may not yet be available. Of course, it calls for applied research, although much of it is more basic than many of us perhaps realize. The gain in productivity in agriculture in the West has been made possible fundamentally by the advance in knowledge.
Thus, one can see that the new inputs to increase the world food supplies must come from outside agriculture. They are not to be found in inputs that farmers themselves can produce in these less-developed countries. The economic requirement that is implicit in these last comments of mine is really quite straightforward. The requirement calls for a transformation of the existing knowledge so that it will be economically useful in poor countries and for a further advance in knowledge that will be applicable in agricultural production.
But we have fallen far short in meeting this requirement. But let me emphasize that a good research enterprise by itself, while an essential, may not lead to increases in agricultural production. To go back to Chile, where the agricultural research program is quite advanced because of good work in which the Rockefeller Foundation has had a hand-in forage crops, food crops, vegetables, and fruit, Chile has good varieties in general, but it has clearly not been successful in its agricultural production during the last two decades. With respect to Colombia, the picture is much as in Chile. In India, despite the breakthroughs that have been made there in corn research, grain sorghum, millet, there has been a long delay in getting the new varieties propagated, multiplied, and distributed to farmers. In the Philippines, where Cornell University has undoubtedly been doing a fine job for a long time, there is nothing yet to show for it in the Philippine agricultural production.
Economic policy can indeed keep a country from realizing the gains in productivity to be had from successful agricultural research. Three economic requirements are sufficient for now. When it comes to increasing agricultural production, they are (1) an efficient system of prices, (2) agricultural inputs that are profitable for farmers, and (3) the discovery and development of such agricultural inputs through organized agricultural research.
